It is a pleasure to write this my last letter to you as chair. This past year has been characterized by a number of challenges and rewards. We underwent an external review, our first in a very long time. This required us to both look carefully at what we do and how we are doing it, as well as what we want to do and how we want to do it. The result of this introspection was a substantial document which provided us both with a coherent story of how we have gotten to where we are today and how we can get to where we should be tomorrow. The external reviewers largely concurred. Not surprisingly the transition from where we are to where we should be will require additional funding, largely for our graduate program. We have asked the provost to provide two-thirds of this funding, providing the remainder ourselves. We wait upon his reply. However, not choosing to stand still, we are implementing as many of the recommendations of the external review committee as we can via redeployments of funds. Our first major project is to completely overhaul our computer lab. Progress is being made, and it should be fully operational by summer's end.
We also re-inhabited Marshall-Adams Hall, a month later than initially scheduled, without a working elevator, with the front staircase unfinished and closed to foot traffic, and a cooling/heating system not yet finely tuned. The building needed to be at its best by the rededication, scheduled for the UM-MSU football weekend. And, I am happy to report, MAH looked the grand-dame she is on that day, wreathed in new landscaping, scrubbed and polished. The following Monday the unfinished and artfully concealed work continued, and continues to this day. We believe the process is converging! My hope is that when I leave this position on 15 August 2006, a year and a month after scheduled completion, that it will indeed be complete and Old Botany will be in the process of being renovated. All we need is a willing donor! Last year we concentrated on senior recruiting. We were searching in international trade, development and labor. We hired in public finance -Stacy Dickert-Conlin -and empirical industrial organization -Michael Conlin. We are exceptionally pleased at our good fortune and I am very happy to welcome them both to the department. As to the abandoned labor and development searches, they were reestablished, and joined this year by our search for our first named chair, The Frederick S. Addy Distinguished Professor of Economics. We are confident that this year we will be successful in all our searches, including our internal one for my replacement! We are still challenged by rising enrolments, increasing numbers of majors, and the never ending search for better ways to deliver a quality education to all students who take our courses. We will be adding two new virtual classes to our roster in the fall, Economics 202: Principles of Macroeconomics, and Economics and 340: Survey of International Economics, while expanding our hybrid and traditional offerings and providing our majors with additional study abroad opportunities. The above quote provides anecdotal evidence that income from taxes and government programs influence behavior. There is a large literature that documents these financial costs of marriage and estimates how a marginal change in the size of the marriage incentives would influence the decision of when or whether to marry or divorce. The consensus is that the financial incentives in government programs may cause the costs to exceed the benefits of marriage such that there are small effects on the decision of whether or when to marry.
Using a law within Social Security that provides clear financial incentives to delay marriage, my research with Mike Conlin and Melissa Koenig extends this literature and estimates the financial value of a month of marriage. Specifically, the law provides that widows who are eligible for Social Security benefits on their deceased spouse's earnings records are eligible for benefits at age 60, unless they remarry before that age. If they remarry before that age, they cannot claim widow benefits and must wait until at least age 62 to claim spousal benefits on their new husband's record, which are typically less generous than widow benefits. In
Voluntary Disclosure of SAT Scores by Michael Conlin
The project I am currently working on (with Stacy Dickert-Conlin and Gabriel Chapman) evaluates the policy implications of allowing the disclosure of SAT scores to be optional on the students who are making college decisions. By not requiring SAT scores for admission, but still allowing students to voluntarily disclose their scores, we argue that colleges may not be effectively addressing fairness concerns. Instead, colleges may be inducing students, even those who perceive the SATs to be unfair, to disclose their SAT scores so that the college admission officers will not assume, by not disclosing their scores, that they did poorly on the SATs.
The decision to reveal SAT scores, even when it is voluntary, is consistent with the economic theory pertaining to voluntary disclosure, which predicts that only those students with the very lowest SAT scores will withhold their scores, because all others will want to avoid the assumption that they have extremely low scores (Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981) . In practice, a relatively large fraction of students withhold their SATs when it is voluntary and one explanation may be that students have objections to the fairness of standardized exams. The National Center for Fair & Open Testing cites admissions staff who indicate that some college applicants do not report their test scores for "philosophical reasons" (page 19) or as a "show of support" (page 23) for the school's policy (Rooney and Schaeffer, 1999) .
Continues on page 4...

Love At What Price? Estimating... by Stacy Dickert-Conlin (Cont'd)
previous research with Mike Brien and David Weaver we show that widows respond to these incentives with significantly lower marriage rates immediately prior to age 60 and an increase at age 60.
To generate an estimate of what this behavior implies about the value of marriage, we use data from five panels of a large data set collected by the Census Bureau, the Survey of Income and Program Participation linked to administrative data from Social Security. The SIPP has detailed information on marital histories of women in the sample. We estimate that the average loss in Social Security benefits associated with remarrying before age 60 is $31,000. The timing of remarriage among the 5.6 percent of women who remarry in our sample (and from earlier work using Vital Statistics marriage data) is consistent with women waiting until age 60 to remarry, but not being willing to wait long.
By taking advantage of the variation in these costs and when or whether widows remarry before age 60, we estimate the benefit of marriage to be approximately $5,000/month. These benefits may include obvious financial benefits such as economies of scale and health insurance, as well as the emotional benefits of a marriage commitment. Although this estimate is large, it appears reasonable in the context of the short length of time widows are willing to wait and the high value of Social Security benefits.
The goal of this project is to empirically test the theory that withholding SAT scores is more likely within certain demographic groups (such as women and minorities) because of perceived biases in the exam. In addition, we will test whether only the students with lower SATs, all else equal, are less likely to report their SATs. We will also directly estimate what fraction of students do not report their scores in a way that is consistent with fairness objections rather than strategic reasons and whether these fractions vary by race and gender.
Our empirical analysis will also address the effect that not reporting SAT scores has on the probability of being admitted to the college in the first place. Perhaps, college admissions personnel underestimate the ability of a student who does not submit her SAT and lower the probability that the student is admitted. The implications of this misinterpretation may vary by race and gender. For example, if the rationale for withholding SAT scores is more likely to be a fairness objection for minorities and women and this is not taken into account in the admission decision, then the optional SAT policy could actually discriminate against these applicants.
Finally, we will estimate the relationship between not reporting SAT scores and subsequent academic performance, such as college grades and retention. This will allow us to not only evaluate the admission decisions but also investigate the possibility that voluntarily withholding SAT scores is a signal of a maturity or ability level that is difficult to measure.
New Faculty Members Starting Fall 2006
We are delighted to announce that Timothy Vogelsang will join us in August as the first Frederick S. Addy Distinguished Professor of Economics. His area of expertise is Econometrics. The department gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support of Mr. & Mrs. Addy to create this new position in our department.
Todd Elder starts in August as Assistant Professor. His area is Labor Economics.
Featured Alumni..
Kevin Jacques first came to Michigan State in the Fall of 1984. While at MSU he did his work in macroeconometrics and was one of the first MSU students to write a dissertation on ARCH/GARCH models under the direction of Richard Baillie. But it was his friendship with Rowena Pecchenino that ultimately provided his big break. In the Fall of 1988, while preparing to enter the job market, Kevin had a discussion in which Rowena mentioned that she had a contact at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC -U.S. agency that supervises nationally chartered banks) and asked him if he ever thought of going to work for the bank regulatory agency. From that discussion came an interview and ultimately Kevin's first job.
It was an interesting time to join the OCC. Under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements, bank regulators from twelve of the world's leading industrialized countries (including the U.S.) were in the process of implementing a set of regulations that made bank capital requirements more responsive to the risk in a bank's portfolio of assets. These standards, known as the risk-based capital standards or the Basel Accord, were ultimately adopted by bank regulators in over 100 countries worldwide. Working with staff from the OCC, as well as those from the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision, Kevin's first project at the OCC was to work on development, implementation, and refinement of this important regulation. Ultimately, this project lead to Kevin's research on how capital regulations influence bank asset allocation, and his research on the Accord has been published in the Journal of Banking and Finance, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Economic Policy Review, the Journal of Economics and Business, the Southern Economic Journal, as well as chapters in edited books. This research continues to be cited extensively by other authors as well as the Basel Committee itself, and has been presented at prestigious conferences including those hosted by the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Chicago, as well as the Basel Committee. In addition, his understanding of financial markets led to work in other areas such as large bank failure resolution and systemic risk which culminated in 1994 with his being detailed to the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. Aside from policy work, Kevin also kept active in academic circles as he was an adjunct professor of finance in the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University.
